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 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 11-1483 
 ___________ 
 
 FRANKLIN D. FENNELL, 




CARL DANBERG; THOMAS CARROLL; DALE RODGERS;  
IHOMA CHUCKS; ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT TO THE COMMISSIONER; 
MAJOR JAMES SCARBOROUGH; NURSE PRACTITIONER;  
NURSE ASSISTANT QUANNI; CORRECTIONAL MEDICAL SERVICES 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the District of Delaware 
 (D.C. Civil No. 1-09-cv-00163) 
 District Judge:  Honorable Sue L. Robinson 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
 or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
June 16, 2011 
 Before:  RENDELL, FUENTES and SMITH, Circuit Judges 
 







 In March 2009, Franklin D. Fennell, an inmate at the James T. Vaughn 
Correctional Center (“VCC”) in Smyrna, Delaware sued a defendant not named above for 
2 
 
injuries he purportedly incurred in prison in 2005 because of lack of adequate medical 
care.  The District Court dismissed the complaint on screening as time-barred, but, noting 
that Fennell suggested that another party delayed or denied him medical treatment at 
another time, allowed amendment.  
 Fennell submitted an amendment in which he added four of the defendants listed 
above for related claims that accrued either in 2005 or at unspecified times.  The District 
Court stated that it appeared that some of the claims were barred by the statute of 
limitations and again dismissed the complaint.  The District Court again granted Fennell 
leave to amend; the District Court directed Fennell to include the date or dates of alleged 
constitutional violations in his amendment.   
 Fennell filed a second amended complaint, naming all of the listed defendants.
1
   
His general claim was that these defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious 
medical needs because they did not provide adequate care and treatment after he became 
infected with Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (“MRSA”) and contracted 
type-2 diabetes.  He specifically registered complaints about his treatment, or lack 
thereof, relating to the alleged MRSA infection in 2005 and 2006, but, as to some 
defendants, he complained that issues with his medical care continued into 2007. 
 As to defendant Danberg, Fennell claimed that Danberg did not implement 
procedures to monitor inmates‟ care, and that “numerous correspondences” alerted 
Danberg to problems with care Fennell was receiving.  Similarly, Fennell alleged that the 
                                                 
 
1As the District Court noted, although “nurse practitioner” is listed separately in the 




former warden, Carroll, did not put in place procedures to monitor contractual medical 
services providers (despite Fennell making him aware of the providers‟ insensitivity to 
the MRSA problem) and failed to adequately supervise staff.        
 Fennell alleged that Scarborough failed to implement procedures to stop staff from 
interfering with his medical treatment.  He claimed that he wrote Scarborough many 
times about staff‟s interference, but Scarborough returned grievances as “non-grievable.”  
Fennell also contended that his medical treatment was inadequate because correctional 
staff informed medical staff about what he could not have in his housing unit (including 
physical therapy and “constant showers or exercise”).    
 Fennell claimed that Rodgers “failed to adequately supervise and train staff and 
put in place procedures so that [Fennell] would receive medically appropriate care.”  He 
also alleged that Rodgers placed him in a housing unit with the knowledge that the 
environment would not be appropriate in light of his medical issues.  He claimed that 
Rodgers abruptly cancelled his pain medication on June 8, 2007.  She allegedly also 
denied him the opportunity to bathe more frequently after an operation and prevented him 
from having follow-up care with an outside specialist.   
 Fennell sued Chuck, a nurse practitioner at VCC, for failing to adequately treat his 
conditions, preventing him from seeing a physician, failing to order or take appropriate 
tests when Fennell presented with MRSA symptoms, and cancelling medications ordered 
by a specialist.  Fennell also brought claims against Quanni, a nurse assistant at VCC, 
who purportedly was late with medication and formed a personal dislike of Fennell.  
Fennell alleged that Quanni ordered correctional officers to take Fennell‟s wheelchair 
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from him in the exercise yard when he was pushing it in front of him.  Fennell also 
named two other defendants without making factual allegations against them.     
 On screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A & 1915(e)(2), the District Court 
dismissed the claims against all the defendants but Rodgers and Scarborough.  The 
District Court dismissed two defendants because Fennell named them without bringing 
claims against them.  The District Court also dismissed the claims against Danberg, 
Carroll, Chuck, and Quanni because Fennell did not include dates related to allegations 
against them.  Additionally, the District Court ruled that Fennell‟s claims against 
Danberg and Carroll were inappropriately based on a theory of respondeat superior.   
 The District Court subsequently denied Fennell‟s motion for appointment of 
counsel.  Ultimately, Rodgers and Scarborough each moved for summary judgment.  The 
District Court granted their motions and entered judgment in their favor.  Fennell appeals 
and asks us to appoint counsel for him.  Rodgers and Scarborough have each filed a 
motion to request that we summarily affirm the District Court‟s judgment.   
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  The review of the District 
Court‟s sua sponte dismissal of some of the claims is plenary, as is our review of the 
rulings on the defendants‟ motions for summary judgment.2  See Allah v. Seiverling, 229 
                                                 
 
2
Although Fennell only designated the order granting judgment in favor of Rodgers and 
Scarborough in his notice of appeal, his appeal from the final judgment in this case brings into 
question the earlier orders dismissing the claims against the other defendants and denying 
appointment of counsel.  Cf. Pacitti by Pacitti v. Macy‟s, 193 F.3d 766, 776-77 (3d Cir. 1999).  
At this pre-briefing stage, we have only the notice of appeal from which to interpret Fennell‟s 
intent.  However, the earlier orders are related to the order granting judgment in favor of the 
remaining defendants and could not be appealed earlier because the final judgment rule barred 
review.  See Pacitti by Pacitti, 193 F.3d at 777.  Furthermore, we review the earlier orders after 
concluding that the defendants are not prejudiced.  See id.      
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F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000);  Abramson v. William Paterson College, 260 F.3d 265, 276 
(3d Cir. 2001).  We review for abuse of discretion an order denying the appointment of 
counsel.  See Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 155 (3d Cir. 1993).  Upon review, we will 
summarily affirm the District Court‟s judgment because no substantial issue is presented 
on appeal.  See Local Appellate Rule 27.4; 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6.   
 The District Court properly granted judgment in favor of Rodgers.  In support of 
her summary judgment motion, Rodgers presented Fennell‟s medical records, which 
showed that Fennell never had the MRSA infection on which so many of his claims were 
based.  The records belie any claim that Rodgers personally, or by policy, procedure, or 
failure to train, interfered with Fennell‟s medical care.  Instead, they detail the history of 
appropriate and aggressive care that Fennell received for his other medical conditions.  
Also, one entry showed that Rodgers was not the doctor who stopped Fennell‟s pain 
medication (and that stopping the pain medication was medically appropriate, partly in 
light of a statement by Fennell at the time).  Although Fennell complained about his 
housing placement (or Rodgers‟s role in his housing placement), the records support 
Rodgers‟s claim that Fennell was housed in the infirmary when medically necessary and 
released into the regular population (with its schedule of baths and exercise) when 
medically indicated (and recommended by the specialists who were caring for him).  In 
addition, the medical records support the proposition that at no time did Rodgers prevent 
Fennell from seeing a specialist when a specialist‟s visit was warranted.  In addition, 
Fennell presented nothing to controvert the evidence that Rodgers submitted (Fennell did 
not respond at all to the motion for summary judgment).         
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 The District Court also properly granted judgment in favor of Scarborough.  First, 
to the extent that Fennell sought damages from Scarborough in his official capacity, 
Scarborough was immune to suit.  See Will v. Mich. Dep‟t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 
71 (1989).  Second, in support of his motion for summary judgment, Scarborough 
submitted a sworn statement in which he averred that, at all relevant times, (1) he did not 
know Fennell; (2) his duties did not include implementing procedures relating to requests 
for medical treatments; (3) he was not personally involved in the grievance process or 
any of Fennell‟s grievances; and (4) he was not personally involved in the matter 
described in the complaint.  In response, Fennell merely argued that Scarborough 
“blatantly lied in reference [to] not being in charge of area.”  His claim was not evidence 
to controvert Scarborough‟s statements.  (Furthermore, Scarborough stated that he was 
“in charge of the area” in that he noted that he was responsible for daily security 
operations and that his duties included “directing and controlling the correctional staff in 
the maintenance of security, order, and discipline of the facility.”)  As the District Court 
concluded,  a reasonable jury could not find that Scarborough was personally involved in 
Fennell‟s claims.     
 The District Court also did not err in dismissing Fennell‟s other claims.  Fennell 
listed two defendants (and asserted two statutory causes of action) without making any 
related allegations.  At least some of the claims against Danberg and Carroll were 
brought on an improper respondeat superior theory.  See Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 
1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988).  
  Also, some claims against all of the named defendants were obviously time-
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barred.  When the affirmative defense of statute of limitations, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c), is 
obvious from the face of the complaint and no development of the record is necessary, a 
court may dismiss a time-barred action sua sponte under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for 
failure to state a claim.  See, e.g., Fogle v. Pierson, 435 F.3d 1252, 1258 (10th Cir. 2006).  
Fennell‟s claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 were subject to Delaware‟s two-year 
statute of limitations for personal injury actions.  See Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 
189-90 (3d Cir. 1993); Napier v. Thirty or More Unidentified Fed. Agents, Employees or 
Officers, 855 F.2d 1080, 1087 n.3 (3d Cir. 1988); see also 10 Del. C. § 8119.  Those 
claims based on injuries that purportedly occurred in 2005 and 2006 are clearly time-
barred.   
 Furthermore, in light of the undisputed evidence in the record, we can affirm the 
judgment because all of Fennell‟s remaining Eighth Amendment claims were without 
merit.  See Erie Telecomms. v. Erie, 853 F.2d 1084, 1089 n.10 (3d Cir. 1988) (holding 
that we may affirm on an alternative basis supported by the record).  “Only „unnecessary 
and wanton infliction of pain‟ or „deliberate indifference to the serious medical needs‟ of 
prisoners [is] sufficiently egregious to rise to the level of a constitutional violation.”  
Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 235 (3d Cir. 2004).  Violations include the intentional 
infliction of pain on a prisoner; the denial of reasonable requests for medical treatment 
where the denial exposes the prisoner to undue suffering or the threat of tangible residual 
injury; and the intentional refusal to provide care in cases where the need for medical 
care is known.  Id.  The medical condition must be serious; and the prison officials must 
be deliberately indifferent to it.  Id. at 235-36.  However, neither claims of medical 
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malpractice nor a disagreement about a course of treatment establishes a constitutional 
violation.  Id. at 235. 
 As noted above, there is no evidence in the record that Fennell ever had a MRSA 
infection.  There is, however, evidence that Fennell‟s other medical conditions were 
carefully and consistently treated (ultimately, the last specialist‟s report from the relevant 
time frame included the notation that Fennell‟s wound had almost completely healed and 
that there was no evidence of recurrence of the problem).  At most, Fennell presented a 
disagreement with the course of treatment for his other medical ailments.  For example, 
he complained about not being able to use his wheelchair as an assist when he was 
exercising, but there are notes from a discussion between Fennell and Rodgers (after 
Fennell again consulted with a specialist) about discontinuing the use of his wheelchair.  
Similarly, in the record, there is Fennell‟s June 2009 letter to his surgeon in which he 
asks for an additional course of care so that he can compel the prison to provide more 
treatment, and the response from the specialist that no additional surgical care is 
indicated.    
 In addition, we conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion when it 
denied Fennell‟s counsel motion.  The District Court considered the appropriate factors, 
see Tabron, 6 F.3d at 155-56, and concluded that Fennell demonstrated an ability to 
present his claims and requests for relief without the assistance of counsel.   
 For these reasons, we grant the motions for summary affirmance filed by Rodgers 
and Scarborough, and we will affirm the District Court‟s judgment.  Fennell‟s motion for 
appointment of counsel is denied.    
